Embodiment & Emergence — Weekly Roundup #5
April 24, 2026 · early development · signal integration · neural constraint · social timing · distributed memory
Introduction
This week’s papers stay close to a basic question: how experience is organized before it shows up as thought, interpretation, or deliberate action. Rather than starting with meaning, they point to earlier processes that shape what is available to be noticed and used in the first place.
The developmental work looks at how these patterns begin in utero. It suggests that what later feels like a stable sense of self is not present at the outset, but emerges from repeated patterns of bodily coordination with the environment. Touch, movement, and internal state are not peripheral inputs. They participate in shaping how relevance is first established, before there is any explicit representation of what something means. Over time, these patterns are not replaced by cognition. They are incorporated into it, forming part of the background structure through which perception, memory, and action are organized. Selfhood is often treated as narrative, reflective, or relational. But it may be better understood as a pattern that forms through ongoing coordination of sensation, action, and interaction. What we call a “self” is not only what is thought or said, but how experience is repeatedly organized and maintained over time.
Framed this way, selfhood can be understood less as a fixed entity and more as a pattern that stabilizes across experience. That has implications for how developmental challenge is approached. If early coordination patterns shape what is later available for perception and response, then change is not only a matter of new interpretation or insight. It may depend on whether earlier patterns of sensing, organizing, and responding can be revisited and modified in ways that are tolerable and usable in the present.
The work on the insula and on large-scale neural activity extends this into how different signals are combined and stabilized. Information related to threat, reward, effort, and internal condition does not remain separate. It is brought together in ways that make some patterns more likely to recur than others. Over time, this creates a background structure that shapes what stands out and what remains peripheral. What is consistently taken up becomes easier to recognize again. What is not tends to fall out of consideration.
The papers on timing and coordination move this into interaction. When people are engaged with one another, what matters is not only what each person thinks is happening, but how quickly they register change, how long they hold information, and how they adjust across time. Differences at that level can make coordination fluid or difficult, even when there is apparent agreement about the situation.
One implication across these pieces is that what feels like a complete picture may be built from a limited set of signals. If something is not being registered or cannot be held in place long enough, it does not factor into what the situation is understood to be. This places practical limits on what responses are available, often without those limits being visible from within the experience itself.
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Back to the Bodily Roots: Prenatal Co‑Embodiment and Early Conscious Experience
Ciaunica, A., Safron, A., & Delafield-Butt, J. (2021). Back to square one: The bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2021 (2), niab040. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab040
TAGS: consciousness; embodiment; pre-reflective self-consciousness; predictive processing; fetal development; sensorimotor integration; co-embodiment; self-preservation; multisensory perception
OVERVIEW: The authors offer a theoretical analysis of the origins of conscious experience, arguing that it must be approached developmentally “from square one,” in early life and specifically in utero. They link consciousness to experiences, and experiences to embodied “experiencing subjects” concerned with self-preservation within a precarious environment. Drawing on predictive processing, phenomenology, and developmental data on fetal sensorimotor activity, they propose that basic self-related experiential structures emerge from early multisensory, action-dependent bodily interactions established by the second trimester of gestation, including co-regulated exchanges within the maternal–fetal dyad.
OF NOTE: Conceptually, the paper challenges adult-centric, vision-based, report-dependent paradigms in consciousness science, emphasizing instead pre-reflective, bodily and relational roots of experience. It suggests that the earliest “environment” of the human subject is another human body, and that co-embodiment and “co-homeostasis” provide the first platform for self–world differentiation. The notion that early tactile, olfactory, proprioceptive and motor experiences function as “first priors” for later perception is consistent with an embodied, systems-interaction view in which conscious life grows like a tree from hidden bodily roots toward later explicit, reportable awareness.
CAVEATS: This is a conceptual and integrative article, not an empirical study; it synthesizes existing phenomenological, developmental, and computational work rather than presenting new data. Timing claims (for example, that neural and sensorimotor bases necessary for perceptual experience and proto-agentive control are in place by the second trimester) are taken from prior literature and not independently evaluated here. The authors explicitly bracket the question of whether fetal experiences are phenomenally conscious in the standard sense, and they do not provide behavioral or neural criteria that would settle this issue. Extrapolations to non-human animals, plants, single cells, or brain organoids are presented as possible future directions, not as established conclusions.
KEY TAKEAWAYS: A careful reader can reasonably take from this paper that any adequate account of consciousness should include: (a) pre-reflective, bodily forms of self-related experience; (b) developmental continuity between early, largely non-visual, non-reportable experiences and later adult forms of consciousness; and (c) the fundamental role of co-embodiment, where the earliest subject–environment relation is the maternal body. For practitioners working with early development or relational contexts, the proposal suggests that early multisensory, action-based and co-regulated bodily interactions may be foundational for how individuals later experience self, body, and world, even if these early roots remain inaccessible to explicit recollection.
Convergent and selective insular representations of pain, appetitive/aversive processing, and cognitive control
Kwon, M., Bo, K., Botvinik-Nezer, R., et al. (2026). Convergent and selective representations of pain, appetitive processes, aversive processes, and cognitive control in the insula. Nature Communications https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-026-71568-9
TAGS: Insula; Convergence zones; Pain; Appetitive processing; Aversive processing; Cognitive control; fMRI; Bayes factors; Functional topography; Neurotransmitter profiles
OVERVIEW: The authors conducted a Bayesian mega-analysis of task-based fMRI data to test how the insula represents four domains: pain, non-somatic appetitive processes, non-somatic aversive processes, and cognitive control. The main analysis pooled 36 study contrasts from 540 participants, with Bayesian model comparison (Bayes Factors) used to identify voxels supporting convergent versus domain-selective responses. Independent datasets (n = 608) were used for validation. Additional functional decoding, coactivation, cytoarchitectonic, and neurotransmitter profiling analyses were used to characterize the identified insular zones and their potential neurobiological substrates. The study reports a hierarchical insular architecture, with a central multi-domain convergence zone in bilateral dorsal anterior insula surrounded by zones showing progressively stronger domain selectivity and convergence gradients.
OF NOTE: Conceptually, the work addresses whether a single “convergence hub” in the insula integrates diverse bodily, affective, and control-related signals, or whether these are segregated into specialized subregions. The finding of a dorsal anterior insula zone that supports multi-domain convergence, embedded within a structured topography of selective and progressively convergent regions, is consistent with views of the insula as a site where heterogeneous information can be combined into unified subjective experiences. From an embodiment and systems perspective, this suggests that insular contributions to pain, appetitive and aversive motivation, and cognitive control arise from interactions across partially specialized yet interconnected subregions rather than a single, undifferentiated control center.
CAVEATS: The abstract does not specify the exact tasks, inclusion criteria, or demographic characteristics underlying the 36 contrasts and 540 participants, nor the composition of the 608-person validation datasets. Domain labels (pain, appetitive, aversive, cognitive control) are derived from study-level contrasts and may aggregate heterogeneous paradigms within each category. Although Bayes Factors and validation datasets strengthen inferences about convergence and selectivity, the analyses are based on existing task fMRI rather than naturalistic behavior, and causal interpretations of insular subregions are not supported by these data alone. Details on spatial resolution, preprocessing, and statistical thresholds are not provided in the abstract, limiting evaluation of sensitivity to fine-grained microstructural boundaries.
KEY TAKEAWAYS: Within the insula, this study identifies both domain-selective and multi-domain convergent zones, organized in a hierarchical pattern centered on bilateral dorsal anterior insula. Pain, non-somatic appetitive, non-somatic aversive, and cognitive control processes show distinct yet overlapping insular representations, rather than mapping to a single common region. Functional decoding, coactivation patterns, and alignment with cytoarchitectonic and neurotransmitter profiles suggest that insular subregions differ in their neurobiological properties in ways that may support this structured topography. For practitioners working with pain, affect, motivation, or control under stress (for example, clinical or high-demand decision environments), the findings suggest that changes in subjective experience may reflect shifts within a distributed insular architecture that integrates multiple informational streams rather than modulation of a unitary “pain” or “control” center.
Predictability shapes the geometry of spontaneous neural activity
Asabuki, T. (2026). Predictability of evoked activity governs the geometry of spontaneous neural manifolds. bioRxiv https://doi.org/10.64898/2026.04.19.719506v1
TAGS: spontaneous activity; neural manifolds; temporal predictability; synaptic plasticity; recurrent circuits; sensory coding; dimensionality; intrinsic dynamics
OVERVIEW: The article proposes a theoretical and circuit-level account of why spontaneous neural population activity occupies a lower-dimensional subspace than stimulus-evoked responses. The authors introduce a local predictive synaptic plasticity mechanism that selectively embeds those components of evoked activity that are temporally predictable on the intrinsic timescale of recurrent network dynamics, while excluding unpredictable fluctuations. In their framework, the dimensionality of spontaneous activity is not fixed but depends on environmental timescales: rapidly varying inputs are filtered out, whereas slowly varying, temporally structured inputs become contextual dimensions within the spontaneous manifold. The model is constructed to reproduce observed patterns of on- and off-manifold coding in visual cortex and to capture developmental changes in the relationship between spontaneous and evoked population activity.
OF NOTE: Conceptually, the work links environmental temporal statistics to the geometry of intrinsic neural dynamics, suggesting that what “fits” into spontaneous activity are those aspects of experience that are predictable given the circuit’s own timescales. This can be interpreted, from an embodiment and systems-interaction perspective, as a proposal that ongoing population activity carries a compact, low-dimensional trace of the organism’s temporally structured sensory environment, rather than a general replay of all past inputs. The emphasis on local predictive synaptic rules highlights how circuit-level interactions, rather than a single control locus, can shape which sensory dimensions are available as contextual background during ongoing activity.
CAVEATS: The abstract describes a theoretical and modeling framework; specific experimental datasets, species, recording methods, and quantitative fit metrics are not specified here. It is not detailed in this section how the proposed predictive plasticity rule is implemented biologically, nor which biophysical mechanisms would support the required timescales. Claims about reproducing on- and off-manifold coding in visual cortex and reconciling developmental findings are made at a summary level, without quantitative error bounds or explicit comparisons to alternative models in the abstract. Generalization beyond the modeled circuits and conditions is therefore not established in this text.
KEY TAKEAWAYS: The study suggests that temporal predictability is a key organizing principle determining which stimulus-evoked dimensions are incorporated into spontaneous neural manifolds. Under the proposed mechanism, spontaneous activity becomes a low-dimensional representation of those environmental features that are predictable on the circuit’s intrinsic timescale, while faster, less predictable components remain off-manifold. This provides a candidate explanation for why spontaneous and evoked population activity can become both more similar and more geometrically distinct over development, consistent with the idea that ongoing activity reflects an interaction between recurrent circuit dynamics and the temporal structure of the environment.
Coupled neural timescales in social interaction
Wolff, A., & Dumas, G. (2023). Coupled neural timescales in social interaction. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2023.02.003
TAGS: social interaction; intrinsic neural timescales; temporoparietal junction; temporal receptive windows; mirroring; mentalizing; interbrain synchrony; excitation–inhibition balance; autism; schizophrenia
OVERVIEW: This review synthesizes evidence that social interaction depends on integrating information over multiple temporal scales and proposes intrinsic neural timescales (INTs) as a key mechanism. INTs are characterized via temporal receptive windows, autocorrelation properties, and a cortical hierarchy from fast sensory/limbic regions to slower association areas. The authors focus on the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) as a hub that coordinates fast mirroring with slower mentalizing processes and link alterations in this temporal hierarchy to social impairments in neuropsychiatric conditions.
OF NOTE: Conceptually, the article reframes social cognition as a problem of temporal integration rather than localized specialization. The proposed INT hierarchy, culminating in the rTPJ, is used to unify dual-process accounts: rapid, automatic mirroring and slower, reflective mentalizing are described as operating on distinct but interacting timescales within a single neurophysiological architecture. Interbrain synchrony during real-time interaction is interpreted as reflecting alignment of these temporal receptive windows across individuals, with mismatched timescales suggested as a mechanism for communicative breakdowns.
CAVEATS: This is a narrative, theory-building review rather than a quantitative meta-analysis, so effect sizes, sample characteristics, and specific task paradigms from the cited literature are not detailed here. The proposed role of rTPJ as an apex integrative hub and the prediction that alignment of temporal receptive windows across individuals facilitates interbrain synchrony are presented as hypotheses grounded in converging evidence, not as experimentally confirmed causal mechanisms. Mechanistic links from excitation–inhibition balance to regional timescales and then to specific social symptoms in autism or schizophrenia remain inferential within the reviewed framework.
KEY TAKEAWAYS: The authors argue that regional differences in intrinsic neural timescales form a cortical hierarchy optimized for processing social information across fast and slow dynamics, with the rTPJ positioned as a central integrator of mirroring and mentalizing systems. They propose that successful social interaction depends on the within-brain coordination of these timescales and on their coupling between brains, as indexed by interbrain synchrony. At a broader level, the review suggests a multilevel account in which molecular-level excitation–inhibition balance shapes synaptic time constants, which in turn constrain systems-level temporal hierarchies and, consequently, observable social behavior and its disruption. In practice, this framework is most relevant to contexts where real-time coordination and perspective-taking under pressure are critical, such as clinical interactions, teamwork, and other high-demand social environments, while remaining a set of testable theoretical claims rather than established clinical tools.
Cognition without brains? Conceptual foundations for learning and memory in microorganisms
Messer, A., Oña, L., & Kost, C. (2026). Cognition without brains? Learning and memory in microorganisms. Trends in Microbiology. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mib.2024.102503
TAGS: microbial cognition; learning; memory; engram; CRISPR-Cas; epigenetics; phenotypic plasticity; horizontal transfer; predictive behavior; identity and lifespan
OVERVIEW: This conceptual review examines whether and how “learning” and “memory” apply to microorganisms. The authors adopt definitions from ecological and cognitive science, treating learning as experience-driven, reversible modification of behaviour or behavioural thresholds, and memory as retention of information for a non-zero period. They classify internal memory into genomic, epigenetic, and persistent/nonpersistent cell memory, and frame all as substance-based engrams. Using case analyses, they distinguish genuine learning from “learning-like” phenomena, and consider both vertical and potential horizontal transfer of memory-related molecules in microbes.
OF NOTE: The review argues that progress in microbial cognition is hampered less by data than by inconsistent terminology. By insisting that learning must be experience-driven rather than purely mutation–selection driven, the authors reclassify “predictive” bacterial responses to correlated environments as adaptive evolution rather than associative learning. In contrast, they suggest the CRISPR–Cas system is a candidate for genetically encoded genuine learning, because bacteriophage encounter alters future defensive behaviour via an acquired genomic spacer. The paper introduces “engraphic learning” for hypothetical cases where memory substances move horizontally between individuals, highlighting that cognition-like capacities can emerge from interactions among molecular, cellular, and ecological systems even in the absence of a nervous system.
CAVEATS: The article is a theoretical synthesis, not a new empirical study; no new quantitative experiments are presented. Many examples, such as protein-aggregate–based cell memory or CRISPR–Cas, are used illustratively and depend on prior work for mechanistic detail. The existence of associative learning in prokaryotes remains unresolved, and proposed mechanisms are explicitly labelled as debated or hypothetical. The discussion of bacterial identity and lifespan is conceptual rather than data-driven, and proposals about engraphic learning via protein or RNA transfer are presented as possibilities, with the authors noting that the range of transferable, experience-related substances and their fitness consequences are “largely undiscovered.”
KEY TAKEAWAYS: The authors propose a clarified, microbe-relevant framework in which memory is substance-based, learning is experience-driven, and many phenomena currently labelled “learning” in microbes are better seen as adaptation or inherited memory. CRISPR–Cas is advanced as a minimal case of genuine learning encoded in the genome, while stochastic adaptation and anticipatory responses grounded in selection are not. They emphasise that assumptions about microbial identity and lifespan critically shape what counts as “within-lifetime” learning, and call for explicitness on these points. For practitioners thinking about systems-level behaviour, the review suggests that even simple organisms may participate in distributed, memory-bearing processes—via vertical inheritance, cell-level state retention, and potentially horizontal exchange of memory substances—that could, in aggregate, resemble cognitive dynamics in more complex embodied systems.
Conclusion
Across these studies, a shared pattern becomes visible. What appears in behavior reflects how information has already been filtered, combined, and stabilized before the moment unfolds. What is available in the moment is not the full set of conditions, but the portion taken up and maintained over time.
The work on neural manifolds makes this visible at the level of population activity. Certain patterns recur because they have been reliable and reinforced. Other possibilities are less likely to appear, not because they are impossible, but because they are not supported by the current organization. This provides one way of understanding why familiar responses persist even when circumstances change. It is not only a matter of habit or preference, but of which patterns are available to be expressed.
Across development, neural activity, and interaction, patterns continue even when conditions change. New experience alone is not enough to shift them. What determines change is whether those patterns are reorganized, not simply what is felt or interpreted.
In interaction, similar constraints show up in coordination. When people align in how they register and track what is happening, they can adjust together as conditions change. When that alignment is off, interaction can narrow or repeat, even without obvious disagreement. What looks like a communication issue can reflect differences in what is being noticed and how it is being held over time.
Taken together, the material in this issue suggests a shift in where to look when trying to understand behavior. Rather than focusing first on interpretation or intention, it can be useful to look at what information is being registered, how it is combined, and how those patterns have developed. From there, the question becomes whether additional information can be taken in and integrated, and whether that changes what becomes possible in action or coordination. The work on microbial memory extends this further, suggesting that learning-like processes can arise from material and relational organization even in the absence of a nervous system.
The practical implication is not immediate change, but clearer orientation. If the range of available responses is shaped by what has been taken up and stabilized, then change depends on expanding what can be registered and held in place, not only on generating new ideas or intentions.
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